naval advisory group vietnam
The first units of the new force arrived at Vung Tau on board the USS Whitfield County (LST-1169) on 7 January 1967 and began training with elements of the U. S. 9th Infantry Division. In microcosm this was the sanctuary tactic employed by the enemy along the national borders with Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam. In December the first baby, a little girl, was born on Sea Float to the obvious delight of every sailor on board. The savage communist assault on the cities of South Vietnam during the great Tet Offensive of 1968 called forth the finest in performance from both the U. S. and the Vietnamese Navies, and at the same time it underscored the prevailing strategic weakness of the overall interdiction effort to that time. A sense of frustration and lack of incentive was part of the dry rot that had set in as early as 1956, paralyzing effective action and inducing a curious numbness in the operating forces. A concerted and innovative psychological operation might succeed in winning the people to active support of the government of Vietnam, the majority of whom were judged to be apolitical. On 21 February 1965, the Commander of the U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam requested the Commander-in-Chief Pacific and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet to send representatives to Saigon to plan a combined U. S.-Vietnamese Navy patrol effort. In September 1965, Rear Admiral Ward raised the question of naval command relationships in Vietnam with CNO and with General Westmoreland. When President Diem was overthrown, Captain Quyen, who was closely associated with the fallen President, and who had been instrumental in defeating several previously attempted coups, was himself murdered by a subordinate officer sympathetic to the incoming regime. In the summer of 1969 a few charcoal kilns were still standing in the midst of the ruins of Old Nam Can. The Ammis were fitted out at Nha Be. Tests were completed on a 36-foot river patrol craft (RPC), and 34 of them were ordered. PC 04 and LSM 405 immediately began a run to the beach, but at a range of about 500 yards encountered small arms and automatic weapons fire. Many of these vessels, of course, have been, and are being, transferred from our inventory to that of the Vietnamese Navy through the ACTOV program. An old Vietnamese woodcutter, captured and abused by the Viet Cong, escaped to tell Vietnamese interrogators that his captors had boasted that they would "visit" Sea Float someday. At 11:00 on the 29th, in a simple ceremony, General Weyand furled the colors of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and formally inactivated it. These in turn were tied in with the U. S. Task Force 115 operations through the various Coastal Surveillance Centers. Concurrent with this announcement, Rear Admiral Norvell G. Ward, the first Navy flag officer to be assigned to Vietnam, was ordered to relieve Captain William H. Hardcastle, Jr., U. S. Navy, as Chief, Naval Advisory Group. There was a general reluctance within the Sea Forces to maintain active patrols. In 1964 an enemy mine sank an aircraft transport which was later raised at her berth in Saigon. Well documented infiltration routes had been traced, and it was one of the three aims of Sea Lords to bar these where they crossed or followed navigable water. The Naval War in Vietnam, 1950-1970 - U.S. Naval Institute A rumor, the authenticity of which could not be determined, circulated on Sea Float that "Hanoi Hannah" herself had taken note of the new operation and she had warned that the MATSB would be "at the bottom of Song Cua Lon by 17 July." The childrens desks were fashioned from ammunition boxes, as were the floors of the classrooms. In 1955 after the French defeat in Indochina the Navy Section became part of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam. Over the years the finest officers and men our Navy could muster were sent to live, to work, and some, eventually, to die alongside their Vietnamese counterparts. By 1954, the strength of the French Navy engaged in the Indochina War stood at more than 10,000 men, and the tiny Vietnamese Navy mustered an additional 1,500 officers and men. 8 A large shipment was considered to be 15-20 sampan lots. In all, more than 800,000 people are thought to have fled the North, while less than 100,000, including Viet Minh troops, opted to make the journey in the opposite direction. Lieutenant Commander Thoai, supported by Lieutenant Commander Sang from the office of the Vietnamese Navy Chief of Staff, refused to order the troops back ashore. "Application of Doctrine; Victory at Van Tuong Village, by Brigadier General O. F. Peatross, U. S. Marine Corps, in Naval Review 1967. Task Force Clearwater. John George Graf | American Battle Monuments Commission Engines were backed just before beaching and the landing was aborted. Contact with a generally elusive enemy was established on seven occasions. Vessels in the contiguous zone, extending 12 miles from the coast, suspected as infiltrators were also made subject to search and seizure. My Time in Vietnam. | Tales of an Asia Sailor [3]:41 That year the U.S. strength in Vietnam grew from about 16,000 men (10,716 Army) to about 23,300 (16,000 Army) in 1964. Vietnamese flags fluttered from the tops of tall cay go poles in each hamlet, and from crude flagstaffs on virtually all water craft, and from the fronts of most of the peoples hootches or shelters. PDF DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is The EOD and UDT teams were often used interchangeably to destroy the enemy's fortifications. Wages, U. S. Navy, and in concert with his Vietnamese Navy counterpart, Commander Nguyen Van Tan, he proposed that the RSSZ area of operations be enlarged temporarily to permit sweeps against the enemys "sanctuary in the Nhon Trach. Meanwhile, to the despair of U. S. Navy advisors, the Vietnamese River Assault Groups frequently found themselves involved in logistic support and static defense roles assigned them by ARVN ground commanders. Inside, according to one staff officer, "the well-waxed corridors had the fluorescent feel of an airport terminal." Until 1964 the Viet Cong were not equipped with standardized weapons and fought with a large variety of French, Russian, Chinese, and captured American arms. They recommended that, since there was no apparent threat to the French in Indochina from the sea, the American naval aid program should be concentrated on a build-up of river and coastal forces of employment against the Viet Minh insurgents. Also attending were representatives from the Vietnamese Army's 23rd Division, the Vietnamese Special Forces, the Vietnamese Navy, and the U. S. Navy. Not far from the landing area, the Special Forces uncovered a large cache of about 4,000 assorted rifles, submachine guns, BAR type weapons, several thousand cases of ammunition, and very large quantities of medical supplies. As a result of his visit, Project Beef-up was launched, which, in addition to more men, money, and supplies for the Vietnamese military, called for increased U. S. operational participation in the war. There was a tendency on our part, based largely upon the observations of our naval advisors, to discount the effectiveness of VNN patrols, but force levels were not determined on the supposition that we would be doing the job alone. "River Patrol Relearned, by Commander S. A. Swarztrauber, U. S. Navy, in Naval Review 1970. This "balloting by feet was acutely embarrassing to the Communists, and during the latter part of the regroupment period the agreement on freedom of movement was openly violated and would-be refugees were prevented from leaving. PCF PRU RAC RAG . Estimates of the areas population have varied from 5,000 to 13,000. [3]:278 Lieutenant General Paul D. Harkins, the Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific, who, as the commander-designate for the task force headquarters (HQ) in the event of operations in Southeast Asia, had participated in the planning for such operations, was appointed commander and promoted to general. "[8]:270, The air-conditioned structure of two-story prefabricated buildings, a little more than a third the size of its Washington namesake, included twelve acres of enclosed office space. They are attached to nearly every Vietnamese naval unit. Daily coastal surveillance flights by SP-2 aircraft, operating from Tan Son Nhut, had begun shortly after the conference of 3 March 1965. USMC Advisory Team Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ), Naval Advisory Group The Junk Force was officered by the Vietnamese Navy, but it was a frequent complaint of U. S. Navy advisors that seldom, if ever, did a Vietnamese naval officer actually accompany the junks on patrol. That night (16-17 February) the requested air strikes and illumination failed to materialize. "Pigs and chickens programs were initiated at most bases to provide the necessary protein that was often lacking in the diet of the Vietnamese dependents. New tactics were devised; new strategies tested. Creation of a NavForV dependent shelter project team to coordinate allocation of materials and technical assistance. The tactic of keeping the enemy constantly on the move, never surrendering the initiative, and denying him a secure base area completely changed the complexion of the war in the "Forest of Assassins." Without the reforms introduced and enforced by this officer, the later "Vietnamization of the naval war would have been virtually impossible. Outside the river mouth, there are restless shoals and a pounding surf. The Naval Advisory Group (NAG) of MACV assumed the responsibilities of the former Naval Section. Vice Admiral Zumwalt and the New Strategy. The companion piece to this tragedy, often conveniently forgotten by later critics of the war and self-styled pacifists, was the liquidation of perhaps 50,000 "enemies of the people, by the Communists own estimate, during the consolidation of Viet Minh rule in the North. A company of Vietnamese Special Forces, meanwhile, would be lifted by helicopter to Dai Lanh, south of Vung Ro, where they would board LSM 405 for an amphibious landing near the sunken trawler: While the conference was progressing, ism 405 was joined at Vung Ro by the Vietnamese PCE 08. U. S. Navy DEs were withdrawn from the Gulf of Thailand on 26 May 1962, and the MSO patrol was suspended on 1 August. They were accompanied by the USS Mercer (APB-39) and the USS Satyr (ARL-23). Part of the increase in the number of attacks on shipping could be attributed to the longer range weapons then coming into use. The concept of sequential turnover was the keystone of the Navys ACTOV plan, and it called for a gradual phasing in of Vietnamese personnel in all U. S. craft and facilities to be turned over. There was, in addition, opposition within the Joint General Staff of the Vietnamese Armed Forces for any aggrandizement of the Vietnamese Navy, which has always been the political inferior of the ARVN. The duty mostly required time riding the rivers on U. S. Navy boats that had been turned over to the Vietnamese Navy. Prior to the establishment of Market Time operations, the Nam Can provided a terminus for many Communist arms shipments arriving from the sea. They were given hot meals, small gifts, and services which ran the gamut from sampan motor repair to the grinding of woodcutters axes on a wheel specially acquired for that purpose in Nha Trang, and shipped to Sea Float by CTF 115. The impact these naval patrols had on the enemy infiltration effort was soon measured in terms of heavy fire fight activity, the seizure of large arms caches, and reports of enemy war material backing up in the north. The task force was organized into two groups, the Hue River Security Group and the Dong Ha River Security Group. [2]: 59 New basing and support concepts were created. The minimum requirement established was that pilot programs be underway and materials stockpiled to complete construction with the arrival of the first dependents at the ACTOV bases. Neither was available. Waterborne transportation is relied upon almost exclusively in the rural areas for the movement of goods and crops to market, and for inter-village communications. The river assault craft of the Brown Water Navy, with few exceptions, notably the ASPB, were modifications of World War II landing craft. U. S. Marines, traditionally the force trained and equipped for amphibious assault operations, were not available, already having been committed in maximum strength to the I Corps Tactical Zone. Operation Search Turn was launched on 2 November 1968 and succeeded in establishing the first of the interdiction barriers, on the Rach Gia Long Xuyen and Ca San Canals in the upper Mekong Delta. I really hope some other people can find this service and get in touch with people like I did. Progressive Management. If you have a conquering spirit and are not afraid of even the most complex problems, apply now to Naval Group! We learned about theses guys in SEAL history during BUD/S. Attacks on the Long Tau were ordinarily carried out by small groups of five or fewer men who, after firing their weapons, simply faded back into their haven in the north. At this time Admiral Ward was both CNAG and CTF 115. Market Time operations were then already in their twentieth week. NAG - Naval Advisory Group. Wet-rice farming, the principal agricultural activity, requires an intricate system of irrigation dikes and canals. As the quotation from General Giap so well affirms, the importance of logistics in war has not changed very much since Napoleons famous dictum that an army travels on its stomach. His long-time associate and premier, Ngo Dinh Diem, announced on 7 July 1955 that a referendum would be held in October to permit the people to choose between Bao Dai and himself. Vietnam: Tonkin Gulf Collection - history.navy.mil The "Vung Ro Incident," as it came to be called, led directly to Market Time, the U. S. Navy's first large-scale operational participation in the Vietnam War. The Rung Sat was the one area where the Navy had, so to speak, a piece of the ground war (responsibility for military operations there rested with the Vietnamese Navy), and as Senior Advisor to the Vietnamese Navy the Admiral considered his position to be somewhat analogous to that of a Senior Advisor to one of the Combat Tactical Zones. In this instance, however, the sanctuary lay wholly within the territory of South Vietnam and scarcely 15 miles from the capital- This situation, spawned and tolerated by the fractured and at times intransigent Vietnamese command structure, had existed for a number of years. Until March 1965 and the beginning of direct U. S. participation in the Vietnam War, the Navy served in an advisory capacity. In the summer and fall of 1966, the establishment of a "Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force (MDMAF) was the subject of discussions between ComUSMACV and ComNavForV. In 1959-1960 he attended the U. S. Naval War College, and his most recent assignment prior to re-assuming command of the Vietnamese Navy was that of Commander, Regional Force Boat Group, a command which did not fall under the operational control of the Navy, and which obviously and providentially had afforded the new Commander-in-Chief some relief from the necessity of having to choose sides in the recent political machinations of the naval officer corps. When he was considered ready to take over, the American would leave and a second VNN sailor would be assigned to train in the duties of another American crew member until eventually the entire crew became Vietnamese. The popular conception of the enemy in Vietnam is that he is an ephemeral figure who travels light, lives off the land, and at the moment of battle somehow always manages to supply himself with arms and munitions dug up from long-buried caches, or plucked magically from the hollow stumps of jungle trees. Selected Documents prepared by the U.S. Marine Advisory Unit, Naval Sea Float sailors constructed schools in each of the two newly settled hamlets. French Union forces suffered more than 172,000 casualties, including 45,000 dead and 48,000 missing. They permitted the enemy to fire from relatively safe positions, well back from the river bank. Finally, the Report indicated that U. S. Navy forces might have to ' be deployed in the Delta rivers to stop Communist infiltration, thus anticipating later Game Warden operations. The two navies together operated more than 300 amphibious ships and craft, 75 patrol vessels and minesweepers, two cruisers, and two aircraft carriers. The change of command took place on 10 May 1965. By 1960, the date on Vietnam's Campaign Medal, a state of armed conflict existed between the two Vietnams and their allies In the morning, shortly after 0800, all three ships moved into Vung Ro Bay, preceded by heavy air strikes and naval gunfire support. As a result of recommendations made to the Secretary of Defense during his July 1965 visit to Vietnam, additional Swift boats were ordered, bringing the approved total to 54 from the 36 originally planned. Naval Advisory Group Naval Forces Vietnam Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer National Police Field Force North Vietnamese Army Patrol Boat, River vii . Public services broke down in the crush. Two of these are the subject and serial files of the immediate office of the Commander. Edit: not mirrored, onset of Vietnam when UDT teams became SEALs. The objective of the raiders was "to stir up the enemy and keep him off-balance," but other dividends were soon realized in terms of enemy equipment destroyed, and in the increased commitments he was forced to make in defense of his well entrenched position in the Nam Can. Overall Market Time operations were controlled from the Surveillance Operations Center located at the Naval Advisory Group Headquarters in Saigon.